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Defining Myanmar’s “Rohingya Problem”
by Benjamin Zawacki*

M

uch has been written either empathetically or as
a challenge of Myanmar’s “Rohingya problem.”
Between June and November 2012, the Rohingya
bore the brunt of communal violence, human rights violations,
and an urgent humanitarian situation in Rakhine State, and still
face an uncertain future.

in the eyes of the Myanmar authorities at least—as evidenced
by the lack of legal accountability for civilians and officials
alike—discrimination also makes the violence and violations
somehow justifiable. This is the Rohingya problem boiled down
to its most basic element.
In 1978’s “Dragon King” operation,
the Myanmar army committed widespread
killings and rapes of Rohingya civilians,
and they carried out the destruction of
mosques and other religious persecution.
These events resulted in the exodus of an
estimated 200,000 Rohingya to neighboring Bangladesh. Another campaign
of forced labor, summary executions,
torture, and rape in 1992 led to a similar
number of Rohingyas fleeing across the
border. In February 2001, communal
violence between the Muslim and Buddhist populations in
Sittwe resulted in an unknown number of people killed and
Muslim property destroyed.1 In late 2008 and early 2009,
Thai authorities pushed back onto the high seas several
boats—lacking adequate food, water, and fuel—of Rohingyas
in the Andaman Sea.2

A great deal of rhetoric has attended
these accounts—by officials and citizens
of Myanmar, Rohingya organizations,
journalists, human rights groups, and
others—essentially attaching labels to
the situation. And while there have been
a number of thoughtful attempts to define
or even explain the Rohingya problem in
historical or political terms, they have
been largely drowned out by emotive
outbursts and media-friendly sound bites.
This is not only unfortunate, it is also consequential, for as was
seen in 2012, rhetoric can influence both the way in which a
crisis plays out as well as in how it is responded to. In other
words, how we talk about what it is we are talking about matters.
What do we mean when we talk about the “Rohingya problem”?

[I]n the eyes of the
Myanmar authorities at least
. . . discrimination makes
violence and violations
somehow justifiable.

In proffering a modest definition of Myanmar’s “Rohingya
problem”—one almost entirely of its own making—three
distinct but related areas of law and fact warrant particular
examination: 1) nationality and discrimination, which focuses
exclusively on Myanmar; 2) statelessness and displacement,
which implicates Myanmar’s neighbors as well; and 3) the
doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, which draws into the
discussion the role of the international community.

All of these events have similar, separate equivalents in
countries in which systemic discrimination does not take place.
Yet in Myanmar such discrimination provides the violence
with a ready-made antecedent, expressly approved by the state.
Indeed to varying degrees, the seminal events noted above
were simply exacerbations of this underlying discrimination:
alarming episodic symptoms of a chronic legal, political, and
economic illness. It would overstate the causality to assert that if
Myanmar had never put its system of discrimination against the
Rohingya into place, then these events would not have occurred.
Eliminating it now, however, is urgently required for a future
of sustainable peace in Rakhine State. Equally important, it is
imperative under human rights law.

These three areas demonstrate that although the root causes
of the “Rohingya problem” are within Myanmar, their effects are
felt regionally and are of relevance even further afield. They are
thus progressively causal, and they imply where efforts toward
solutions should be directed and prioritized.

The system’s anchor is the 1982 Citizenship Law, which in
both design and implementation effectively denies the right to a
nationality to the Rohingya population. It supersedes all previous
citizenship regimes in Myanmar.3 The 1982 Citizenship Law
creates three classes of citizens—full, associate, and naturalized
—none of which has been conferred on most Rohingyas.

Nationality and Discrimination
The violent events of 2012, as well as those of 1978, 1992,
2001, and 2009, can be attributed to systemic discrimination
against the Rohingya in Myanmar. That is, to a political, social,
and economic system—manifested in law, policy, and practice—
designed to discriminate against this ethnic and religious minority. This system makes such direct violence against the Rohingya
far more possible and likely than it would be otherwise. Further,

Myanmar reserves full citizenship for those whose ancestors
settled in the country before the year 1823 or who are members
of one of Myanmar’s more than 130 recognized national ethnic
groups, which do not include the Rohingya. Associate citizens
are those who both are eligible and have applied for citizenship
under a previous 1948 law. This requires an awareness of the law
that few Rohingya posses and a level of proof that even fewer

* Benjamin Zawacki is the Senior Legal Advisor for Southeast Asia
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Council on Foreign Relations. The views expressed in this article,
however, are his own.
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are able to provide. Access to naturalized citizenship is similarly,
available only for those who resided in Myanmar on or before
1948. With all three classes, the Central Body has the discretion
to deny citizenship even when the criteria are met.4

indisputably made citizens. Rohingyas born in Myanmar who
would otherwise be stateless should be granted citizenship, as
should those who are not born there but are able to establish a
genuine and effective link to the country. Myanmar should also
eliminate its policies and practices that discriminate against the
Rohingya on the grounds of ethnicity and/or religion.

The 1982 Citizenship Law’s discriminatory effects are also
extremely consequential. The main effect is that the Rohingya,
most of whom lack citizenship in Myanmar, have been rendered
stateless, both unable to avail themselves of the protection of the
state and—as has been the case for decades—subject to policies
and practices that constitute violations of their human rights and
fundamental freedoms. These include restrictions on movement;
forced labor; land confiscation, forced eviction, and destruction
of houses; extortion and arbitrary taxation; and restrictions on
marriage, employment, health care, and education.5 Although
not limited to Rohingyas, these restrictions are not imposed
in the same manner and to the same degree on Buddhists or
other Muslims in Rakhine State, or on other
ethnic minorities across the country.
This is systemic discrimination: laws,
policies, and practices, though designed
and carried out by people, are ultimately
part of or attributable to a system that
ensures discrimination even in the absence
of discriminatory individuals.
It is unlawful. As a member of the
United Nations, Myanmar is legally obliged
to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion,” as declared
in Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter.

More than any other single step, dismantling its system
of discrimination would bring Myanmar’s Rohingya problem
closer to a solution.

Statelessness and Displacement
Because Myanmar’s Rohingyas have been deprived of a
nationality, they are rendered stateless. The human rights effects
of this both for Rohingyas inside Myanmar and those living
abroad as refugees are substantial.

[L]aws, policies,
and practices . . . are
ultimately part of
or attributable to a
system that ensures
discrimination even in the
absence of discriminatory
individuals.

Inside Myanmar, a kind of circularity
exists whereby systemic discrimination
renders the Rohingya stateless, while their
status as a stateless population acts as
validation for further discrimination and
persecution by the state and its citizens.
Because of this, access to a nationality is
commonly known as “the right to have
rights.”9 This description, however, is only
correct in fact but not as a matter of law;
all human rights belonging to citizens also
belong to stateless persons.

Immigration law may legitimately
distinguish between those with and those
without a nationality. But just as states’
authority to confer nationality is restrained
by a prohibition on denial based on ethnicity or religion, they
likewise cannot apply immigration law at the expense of basic
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Similarly, although
human rights law allows for the conditional suspension of
certain rights during emergencies, it does not permit—as was
the case during the state of emergency declared in northern
Rakhine State in June 201210—derogation from the right to life
(among other rights).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights—though not
a binding document—provides in Article 15 that “everyone
has the right to a nationality.” Article 2 holds that everyone is
entitled to all the rights in the Declaration “without distinction
of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.” So significant is this anti-discrimination language
that it can be found in five more international human rights
documents, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC)6 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).7

There are two international treaties on statelessness, neither
of which Myanmar has signed or ratified. At first glance, the
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons would
seem to be the more relevant to the Rohingya, for it pertains
to the treatment of de jure stateless persons. A de jure stateless
person is one “who is not considered as a national by any state
under the operation of its law.”11 Both its Preamble and Article
3 contain non-discrimination clauses, while other provisions
provide protections in respect to religion, property, employment,
education, public assistance, and social security,12 all implicating
the situation of the Rohingyas in Myanmar.

Myanmar has ratified both of these documents, making
their provisions binding on the state. According to Amnesty
International, it is a violation “to be deprived of one’s rights
because of a characteristic that one cannot change—such as
one’s race or ethnic origin—or because of a characteristic that is
so central to one’s being that one should not be forced to change
it, such as religion.”8
In addition, Article 7 of the CRC provides for the right of
a child to a nationality, “in particular where the child would
otherwise be stateless.” It is clear that Myanmar, as a State Party
to this treaty, is in violation of its international legal obligations
pertaining to the right of Rohingya children to a nationality.

Yet, it is far from clear that the Convention would even apply
to the Rohingya in Myanmar, as it applies only to stateless
persons deemed to be legally residing in the country at issue.
Applicability would thus turn on whether, by virtue of the 1982
Citizenship Law, the Rohingya are deemed by Myanmar not to
be legally residing in its territory, or whether other actions by
the authorities since 1982 indicate or confer legal residency.13

Myanmar should substantially amend the 1982 Citizenship
Law or repeal and redraft it, such that the Rohingya are
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of northern Rakhine State, land confiscation, evictions from
homes and homesteads, and the construction of model villages.17
The UN Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons,
with its focus on rights and non-discrimination, should form the
basis of the Myanmar government’s treatment of these internally
displaced Rohingyas, but clearly this has not been the case.
Although non-binding, the Principles contemplate all those
internally displaced, including stateless persons.
It is believed that more Rohingya live outside Myanmar than
the estimated 800,000 who live inside the country,18 creating
an involuntary diaspora through two and a half decades of
both overt forced deportation and removal by state authorities,
as well as the communal violence state policy has facilitated.
These people are not simply refugees—a difficult enough
status to cope with—but stateless persons outside their territory
of habitual and historical residence.

Courtesy United Nations Development Programme

This status does not change the root causes of the Rohingya
problem, but it does extend the focus beyond Myanmar alone
and onto its immediate and regional neighbors. Saudi Arabia is
thought to host 500,000 Rohingyas.19 In Bangladesh, the country
that has and continues to host the largest number of recognized
and unrecognized Rohingya refugees, 29,000 live in official
camps, while another 200,000 live in makeshift settlements or
amidst the local border population.20 Smaller populations reside
in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and India. October each year
marks the start of the annual six-month sailing season, wherein
Rohingyas flee persecution in Myanmar via smugglers on boats
that are often unseaworthy.21

Rohingya were permitted in 1990 to form political parties
and vote in multiparty elections. Myanmar accepted some
250,000 repatriated Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh in
1992 and in 1994 began issuing Temporary Resident Cards to
some of them (although the country also ceased issuing birth
certificates to Rohingya babies the same year). Rohingyas were
permitted to vote in both the 2008 Constitutional referendum
and the 2010 national elections, for which they were also
granted a form of temporary identification card. As Myanmar
does for all residents, the authorities have maintained lists
of Rohingya families for several decades.
If the 1982 Citizenship Law renders the Rohingya illegal
residents, then the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons reflects and actually contributes to the circularity in
Myanmar described above. It effectively “scores an own goal”
by allowing states—through the very discrimination it was
designed to contest—to opt out of adhering to its provisions.
If the authorities do consider the Rohingya as legally residing
in Myanmar, however, then the Convention would apply, and
Myanmar should be urged to ratify and implement it.14

None of these countries fully respects the Rohingyas’ right
to seek and enjoy asylum or the right to not be sent back to a
country in which they have a well-founded fear of persecution
on grounds of (among others) ethnicity or religion. Known as
non-refoulement, this principle makes irrelevant the fact that the
countries mentioned are not States Parties to the UN Convention
on the Status of Refugees.22 The prohibition against involuntary
return of asylum-seekers and refugees is a matter of customary
international law, meaning that it applies regardless of a nation’s
treaty status.

The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, in
contrast, is of indisputable relevance to Myanmar’s Rohingyas,
as it obligates States Parties to prevent, reduce, and avoid statelessness through taking certain positive measures, especially by
granting “its nationality to a person born in its territory who
would otherwise be stateless.”15 This Convention should thus
be the focus of increased advocacy as a solution to the problem.

Instead, citing immigration concerns, economic incentives
or constraints, or questionable claims of national security,23 all of
these countries have resorted to detention, forced repatriation, the
deprivation of basic necessities on the high seas, informal deportation to traffickers, and/or direct participation in trafficking.
The human rights and humanitarian records of Bangladesh and
Thailand in particular have long been notably poor in relation to
the Rohingya.24 As such, they are in breach of their international
legal obligations pertaining to asylum-seekers and refugees.

At least hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas have been
physically displaced over the past 25 years, both internally and
outside of Myanmar. Although hardly an exhaustive list, the five
seminal events noted above, in 1978, 1992, 2001, 2009, and
2012, all featured or resulted in such displacement. Internally,
not only has communal violence displaced Rohingyas, but state
policy, practice, and participation—including in either instigating or failing to stop communal violence—have accounted
for internal displacement as well. At least 115,000 Rohingyas
are still in camps away from their homes in the wake of last
year’s clashes.16 State authorities have forcibly or arbitrarily
transferred Rohingyas over the years through militarization

Further, none of the countries directly affected by the
Rohingyas’ displacement is a party to the Convention on the
Status of Stateless Persons. While, as explained above, this
Convention possibly acts against its own interests in Myanmar,
it is notably appropriate to its regional neighbors.25 Unable to
avail themselves of the diplomatic or consular protection of
Myanmar, the Rohingyas’ stateless status places them in the
same position everywhere, whereby their “right to have rights”
is seen by the authorities as lacking. It simply compounds the
precariousness of their situation.
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Along with ending systemic discrimination in Myanmar,
a solution to the Rohingya problem would be significantly
advanced if Myanmar and its regional neighbors abided
by the human rights provisions pertaining to stateless persons
and refugees.

Interestingly, Schabas is also the author of a 2010 report
titled Crimes against Humanity in Western Burma: The Situation
of the Rohingyas, in which he concluded that “[u]nder the
circumstances, it does not seem useful at this stage to pursue
an analysis that necessarily depends on an expansive approach
to the definition of genocide.”31 He explained that international
tribunals and other bodies have been unwilling to interpret the
scope of genocide beyond “the intentional physical destruction
of a group,”32 and so clearly implied that such intentional
physical destruction of the Rohingya as a group was not taking
place. While not ruling out the technical charge of genocide
based on a “simplistic analysis of the factual findings” of the
report, Schabas steered clear of assessing the Rohingya situation
through the application of the genocide definition.33

The Responsibility to Protect
The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, agreed upon by
the UN General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document, has three main pillars: 1) the state carries the primary
responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their
incitement; 2) the international community has a responsibility
to encourage and assist states in fulfilling this responsibility;
and 3) the international community has a
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other means to protect
populations from these crimes. If a state
is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be
prepared to take collective action to protect
populations, in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations.26
This doctrine applies to the situation of
the Rohingyas in Myanmar if one or more
of the four expressed crimes is being or
has been committed against them, and if
Myanmar is “manifestly failing” to protect
them.

If a state is manifestly
failing to protect
its populations, the
international community
must be prepared to take
collective action to protect
populations.

Have the circumstances and factual
findings since 2010 changed such that at
this stage an argument would be persuasive
that an intentional physical destruction of
the Rohingya is underway in Myanmar?
Schabas’s remarks on Al-Jazeera are essentially consistent with his 2010 report, as
most of what he notes is not necessarily
aimed at physically destroying the Rohingya
as a group, and even the communal violence
of 2012 and the government’s response—
which he does not address—do not clearly
implicate such an expansive definition
of genocide.

Rather, what the Rohingya have exper
ienced for decades recalls Schabas’s conclusion in 2010: crimes
against humanity. A crime against humanity is defined in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as “any of the
following acts when committed as part of a 1) widespread or
systematic 2) attack directed against any 3) civilian population,
4) with knowledge of the attack”.34 Schabas added that it is
necessary that the perpetrator act pursuant to or in furtherance
of a state or organizational policy.35

As there is no armed conflict in Rakhine State, war crimes
are clearly not at issue. Genocide, however, was claimed on dozens of other occasions during the latter half of 2012, mostly by
journalists, commentators, and Rohingya activists, but also by
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in November.27
International law defines genocide as acts “committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group.”28 Such acts are listed as killing members
of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.29

Among the eleven acts listed in the Rome Statute, nine are of
varying relevance to the Rohingya in Myanmar: murder; forcible
deportation or transfer of a population; imprisonment or other
severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental
rules of international law; torture; rape, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, or religious grounds;
enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; and
other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering or serious injury.36

The most credible use of the term in relation to Myanmar
came from Professor William Schabas, who from 2009-2011
was a member of the International Association of Genocide
Scholars. In an Al-Jazeera documentary entitled “The Hidden
Genocide” that first aired on December 9, 2012, he stated:

Schabas argued that “the Rohingya are the prima facie
victims of the crime against humanity of persecution,”37 consisting
of “the severe deprivation of fundamental rights on discriminatory grounds.”38 The analysis is not dissimilar to discrimination
discussed above, though placed squarely within the five elements
that constitute a crime against humanity. Schabas also accurately
asserted that the government of Myanmar has perpetrated the
forcible transfer of the Rohingya population, via expulsion or
other coercive acts.

[I]n the case of the Rohingya we’re moving into a zone
where the word can be used. When you see measures
preventing births, trying to deny the identity of a people,
hoping to see that they really are eventually—that they
no longer exist—denying their history, denying the
legitimacy of their right to live where they live, these
are all warning signs that mean that it’s not frivolous
to envisage the use of the term genocide.30
21

Zawacki: Defining Myanmar's "Rohingya Problem"
He stopped short, however, of concluding that this crime
against humanity also constitutes ethnic cleansing and it is
here that his overall argument—accurate enough in 2010—is
incomplete in view of the events of 2012. Ethnic cleansing is
“rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.”39
It is distinct from genocide in its intent—to remove rather than
destroy the group. Schabas stated: “Since at least 1978, the
SPDC40 have persistently tampered with the ethnic make-up
of the region. However, it cannot be said with any degree of certainty that the intent behind such actions is to ethnically cleanse
North Arakan State.”41 This would no longer seem to be the case.

of Rohingyas had fled the state capital of Sittwe, where their
homes, shops, and mosques were destroyed like those of their
compatriots elsewhere.55 According to Border Affairs Minister
Lt. Gen. Thein Htay, the city reportedly consisted of “lines that
cannot be crossed.”56 However, in what was described as their
largest ever public gathering, ethnic Rakhines in Sittwe “laid
out an ultra-nationalist manifesto approving, among other things
. . . the formation of armed militias, . . . removal of Rohingya
villages, and the reclamation of land that had been ‘lost’ to [the
Rakhines].”57 They also came out against plans to reunite their
community with the Rohingya.58
In October, a week before the second outbreak of violence
on October 21, hundreds of ethnic Rakhines, including monks,
demonstrated for several days in support of relocating the
residents of the Aung Mingalar part of Sittwe, an almost entirely
Muslim area.59 Human Rights Watch observed, “Segregation
has become the status quo.”60 In the midst of the violence,
several hundred Buddhists reportedly demonstrated in Sittwe in
support of a ten-point document circulated by the All-Arakanese
Monks’ Solidarity Conference, calling for the targeting of
Rohingya sympathizers as national traitors, and the expulsion
of Rohingyas from Myanmar.61 Most Rohingya neighborhoods,
including unburned buildings, were bulldozed in the days following the violence.62 Further, as the government admitted that
the violence against the Rohingya was instigated and organized,
rather than spontaneous,63 the New York Times reported that
anti-Islamic pamphlets appeared in Rakhine State.64

Action by ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and inaction by the
authorities—both aided and abetted by years of persecutory
policy and recent statements by officials—strongly suggest that
what is being prosecuted in Rakhine State is an effort to remove
the Rohingya from the area. President Thein Sein himself
set the tone in July when he stated that the Rohingya could
not and would not be accepted as either citizens or residents
of Myanmar, and he asked the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) to consider placing them in camps outside
of the country and resettling them to others.42 That is, he wanted
them removed from Myanmar.
It is true that both he and other officials have moderated
that position to some extent since.43 In August, the President
pledged to open more schools for Rohingya.44 In September
the Minister of Immigration stated that the Rohingya have
the right to apply for citizenship,45 and the Vice President
pointedly called for increased economic development for “both
sides” in Rakhine State.46 In November the Foreign Minister
pledged to return the displaced in Rakhine State to their homes
as soon as possible.47 That month the President wrote a letter
to the UN Secretary-General promising unspecified rights for
the Rohingyas.48

By November—when the number of displaced persons
reached roughly 115,000 and consisted almost entirely of
Rohingyas65—the situation was most accurately described by
The Economist:
[I]ts main contours are clear: a vicious and bloody
campaign of ethnic cleansing by) (the Rakhines that is
intended to drive Rohingyas out. Rakhine politicians
say frankly) (that the only alternative to mass deportation is a Burmese form of apartheid, in which more
Rohingyas are corralled into squalid, semi-permanent
internal-refugee camps.66

Despite these words, however, the actions, developments,
and facts on the ground still support the conclusion that ethnic
cleansing49 is underway in Rakhine State. Proceeding chronologically and merging relevant official actions and statements
with those of relevant non-state actors,50 in August the Rakhine
Nationalities Development Party’s (RNDP) Dr. Aye Maung
reportedly urged rice sellers to refuse Rohingya buyers and said
that Rakhine State should “be like Israel.”51 In a review of the
situation prepared for Parliament that month, President Thein
Sein reportedly stated that ethnic Rakhines were targeting and
terrorizing the Rohingya population, and that Rakhines could
not accept Rohingyas as citizens or residents of Myanmar.52
In September, groups of monks in Mandalay demonstrated for
several days urging the removal or internment of the Rohingya
in Myanmar.53 The U.S. deputy national security advisor noted
this problem and stated, “In Burma, preferential treatment
for Buddhists and prejudice against ethnic South Asians,
particularly ethnic Rohingya Muslims, fuels tensions between
the Buddhist majority and Christian and Muslim minorities.”54

That month, Buddhist groups reportedly prevented doctors
and aid workers from delivering medical assistance to camps of
Rohingyas, and distributed pamphlets threatening them against
continuing their work in Sittwe.67 Reuters reported that military
sources said the second wave of attacks against the Rohingya
—resulting in several more villages completely destroyed
or cleansed—were planned and orchestrated by Rakhine nationalists tied to the RNDP (which denied official involvement).68
Echoing the title of an August 2012 Human Rights Watch report
produced after the initial violence (The Government Could
Have Stopped This), a member of the National Democratic
Party for Development, said “There were [threats of violence]
ahead of the riots—we knew Kyaukphyu was going to burn and
repeatedly warned concerned government authorities about it
but they kept on saying ‘we got it’ and then the town was burnt
down.”69 A government self-survey of ethnicity in Rakhine State
did not contain the option of “Rohingya,” with those refusing
to choose “Bengali” reportedly designated as such against their
will or excluded altogether—in both cases potentially making
them “illegal.”70

By mid-September, an estimated 76,000 persons in Rakhine
State were living in camps. Most were Rohingyas, unable to
work, go to school, buy goods either inside or outside the
camps, or even leave them without fear of being beaten by ethnic
Rakhines or detained by the authorities. Farther south, thousands
22
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December saw vehement official denials of the Al-Jazeera
documentary’s conclusions, noted above, though the report’s
findings were revealing. A Burmese academic stated that
Rakhine State is “our ancestral land, we cannot share that land,
you know, for any aliens or immigrants.”71 He also said that “no
Muslim, no Bengali living in that town [of Taungoo] because
the town people, town folk, do not allow any Bengali people
to come here.”72 A Sittwe-based monk not only repeated this
statement but reasoned it is why ethnic Rakhine Buddhists killed
ten Muslims there in early June, setting off the initial communal
violence: “They felt insulted and were furious when ten Muslims
dared to pass through the town.”73
Al-Jazeera displayed a July 2012
statement by the RNDP’s Dr.
Aye Maung that “Bengali people
should be relocated to suitable
places . . . in order not to reside
or mix with Rakhines.”74 And it
stated that in the Aung Mingalar
section of Sittwe, the Rohingyas
“are fenced in and cannot leave.”75

regarding Myanmar that expressed its “serious concern” about
the situation in Rakhine State.82 It also called for government
action in relation to “arbitrarily detained persons,” the “return
of individuals to their original communities,” the “restitution of
property,” and a “policy of integration . . . and peaceful coexistence.”83 Although the government “accepted” the General
Assembly’s calls, it undermined its approval by protesting the
use of the word “Rohingya” in the resolution.84
The General Assembly did not formally invoke the
Responsibility to Protect. Possible reasons include that it did
not judge the situation in Rakhine State to constitute crimes
against humanity and/or ethnic
cleansing that it deemed that
Myanmar itself was exercising its
primary responsibility to protect
its citizens, or that it assessed that
the notoriously difficult political
hurdles attending the doctrine’s
successful invocation made it
a non-starter. Only the third
possibility is valid: ethnic cleansing is taking place in Myanmar,
and as Myanmar is “manifestly
failing to protect its populations,
the international community must be prepared to take collective
action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations85….”

Primary responsibility rests with
the Myanmar government to protect
those whose right to a nationality
the country has long denied, but its
regional neighbors have legal and
humanitarian obligations[.]

By the end of 2012, hundreds of
Rohingya villages or settlements
had been destroyed, tens of thousands of homes razed, and at least 115,000 Rohingyas displaced
in camps or “ghettos” in Myanmar, across the Bangladeshi border,
or further afield on boats.76 According to the International Crisis
Group, “There have been indications that the local authorities .
. . might invoke colonial-era legislation that empowers them to
reclaim areas damaged by fire as state-owned land.”77 Officials
stated that the segregation was temporary for the safety of the
Rohingyas and intended to prevent further violence, which was
doubtless true in July when the process began. That organized
violence had broken out again in October, however, and that the
segregation had only increased, exposed the weakness of the
statement in fact if not intent. Indeed, the most convincing indication that ethnic cleansing—the forcible removal—of the Rohingya
in Rakhine State is underway is that so many have in fact been
removed from their homes, neighborhoods, cities, and country.78

The Rohingya problem has been referred to and described in
different ways, and certainly it is more than a matter of nationality and discrimination, statelessness and displacement, and the
Responsibility to Protect. Yet the initial two areas have assumed
particular factual and legal significance over the past three
decades, as persecution of the Rohingya within Myanmar and its
effects regionally have continued unabated. The third area—not
unrelated to the others—should assume equal importance and
attention, but thus far it has not. All three issues are progressive
in their application to the Rohingya: persecutory discrimination
and statelessness includes and leads to forcible displacement,
which combined constitute crimes against humanity and ethnic
cleansing and implicate the Responsibility to Protect.

Certain lawmakers in Indonesia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Japan referred to the situation in Rakhine State as ethnic cleansing
in August and September. The Organization of Islamic
Cooperation “expressed disappointment over the failure of the
international community to take action,”79 and Saudi Arabia
urged the “international community to take up its responsibilities by providing needed protection.”80 The formal doctrine of
the Responsibility to Protect, however, gained no appreciable
traction among policy-makers.81

Primary responsibility rests with the Myanmar government
to protect those whose right to a nationality the country has long
denied, but its regional neighbors have legal and humanitarian
obligations of their own vis-à-vis the Rohingya, as does the international community. The Rohingya problem begins at home—and
could well end there with enough political will. Failing that, as has
been the case since June 2012 if not decades, regional countries
and the wider world should act to address the displacement and
statelessness, and to stop the violence and violations.

In November, the UN General Assembly (within which
the Responsibility to Protect originated) adopted a resolution
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